

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 10-05-2007		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE "Strategic Communication and the Geographic Combatant Commander: Using Principles of War to Win Peace"		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
		5b. GRANT NUMBER		
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR Heath D. Bohlen, LCDR, USN Paper Advisor: Stephanie Helm, CAPT, USN		5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
		5e. TASK NUMBER		
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.				
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.				
14. ABSTRACT Though the importance of strategic communication (SC) has been identified and often conceptualized at the National/Strategic level, it is at the Theater level and below that much of the interaction with adversaries and potential adversaries takes place. As such, the ability of the U.S. to win the "long war" will rely heavily on the ability of geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) to effectively plan for and employ the instruments of soft power, including SC. Through these efforts, the GCCs will wage the battle of ideas and, in doing so, aim to prevent the creation of new generations of enemies. To achieve success, GCCs will need to treat SC as they would any other mission area by applying selected principles of war. Through the proper planning and employment of SC, utilizing the principles of objective, unity of command/effort, offensive and mass, GCCs can defeat potential enemies before they reach the battlefield. This paper provides the current definition of SC, discusses the organizational framework supporting SC, analyzes the validity and necessity of SC as a GCC mission and examines SC efforts from the perspective of selected principles of war with a focus on how GCCs have used these principles to effectively employ SC. This paper concludes by providing recommendations for future employment of SC by the GCCs.				
15. SUBJECT TERMS Strategic Communication, Combatant Commander, Information Operations, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Theater Security Cooperation				
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED		20
				19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept
				19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI**

**STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND THE GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT
COMMANDER: USING PRINCIPLES OF WAR TO WIN PEACE**

By

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

Though the importance of strategic communication (SC) has been identified and often conceptualized at the National/Strategic level, it is at the Theater level and below that much of the interaction with adversaries and potential adversaries takes place. As such, the ability of the U.S. to win the “long war” will rely heavily on the ability of geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) to effectively plan for and employ the instruments of soft power, including SC. Through these efforts, the GCCs will wage the battle of ideas and, in doing so, aim to prevent the creation of new generations of enemies. To achieve success, GCCs will need to treat SC as they would any other mission area by applying selected principles of war. Through the proper planning and employment of SC, utilizing the principles of objective, unity of command/effort, offensive and mass, GCCs can defeat potential enemies before they reach the battlefield. This paper provides the current definition of SC, discusses the organizational framework supporting SC, analyzes the validity and necessity of SC as a GCC mission and examines SC efforts from the perspective of selected principles of war with a focus on how GCCs have used these principles to effectively employ SC. This paper concludes by providing recommendations for future employment of SC by the GCCs.

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INTRODUCTION

“Victory in the long war ultimately depends on strategic communication by the United States and its international partners.”¹

-- Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006

As Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM continue through their fifth and sixth years, respectively, the importance of the war of ideas has risen to the forefront in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), a fact clearly highlighted in the 2006 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*: “In the long run, winning the war on terror means winning the battle of ideas, for it is ideas that can turn the disenchanted into murderers willing to kill innocent victims.”² To aid in this battle of ideas, the United States has increased focus on strategic communication (SC) as a means to combine words and actions into an effective message through the synchronization of multiple lines of operation.

Though the importance of SC has been identified and often conceptualized at the National/Strategic level, it is at the Theater level and below that much of the interaction with adversaries and potential adversaries takes place. As such, the ability of the U.S. to win the “long war” will rely heavily on the ability of geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) to effectively plan for and employ the instruments of soft power, including SC. Through these efforts they will wage the battle of ideas and, in doing so, aim to prevent the creation of new generations of enemies. To achieve success, GCCs will need to treat SC as they would any other mission area by applying selected principles of war. Through the proper planning and employment of SC, utilizing the principles of objective, unity of command/effort, offensive and mass, GCCs can defeat potential enemies before they reach the battlefield.

¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report 2006* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2006), 91-92.

² U.S. President, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, DC: White House, 2006), 9.

This paper will provide the current definition of SC, discuss the organizational framework supporting SC, analyze the validity and necessity of SC as a GCC mission and examine SC efforts from the perspective of selected principles of war with a focus on how GCCs have used these principles to effectively employ SC. This paper will conclude by proposing recommendations for future employment of SC by the GCCs.

DEFINITION

“...If words are not accompanied by action they have no value, theory not demonstrated by reality is only empty theory.”³

*-- General Tran Van Tra
Commander, People’s Revolutionary Party
Central Office in South Vietnam (COSVN)*

Before analyzing how to effectively use SC, it is important first to define what it is. Although various definitions exist within Department of Defense (DoD) publications, the *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Strategic Communication (SC) Execution Roadmap* defines SC as “Focused United States Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power.”⁴ The two most important considerations with this definition are the references to actions and synchronization. Though it is common to think of SC only in terms of words, the actions are equally, if not more, important. Furthermore, the ability to combine those actions with words in a synchronized way is truly the critical piece of SC--actions and words must convey

³ Tran Van Tra, “Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theater: Vol 5: Concluding the 30-Years War,” quoted in Eric M. Bergerud, *The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 62.

⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Strategic Communication (SC) Execution Roadmap* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 2006), 3.

the same message. This ability to combine words and actions into one comprehensive message is, in essence, the challenge to achieving effective SC.

ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK

“Combatant Commanders should harness all strategic communication capabilities, including public affairs, public diplomacy (military support to public diplomacy and military diplomacy) and information operations, and work with the interagency to implement a synergistic strategic communication effort.”⁵

-- 2006 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism

To better understand how GCCs can formulate SC plans that synchronize actions and words into an effective message, it is important to look at the framework within which they are expected to operate. National security and defense publications have recently identified the importance of SC but it is a discipline that, from an organizational standpoint, remains in its infancy. Formal Theater and Strategic frameworks are still in development. In this current state, without a clear framework to “harness capabilities” and “work with the interagency,” a “synergistic” approach is hard to design. GCCs may bear a great deal of responsibility for conducting effective SC, however, their ability to formulate a cohesive message depends on actions at the National/Strategic level. Both the clarity of the objectives and guidance as well as the effectiveness of interagency coordination, particularly between DoD and the Department of State (DoS), are important enablers of GCC SC success.

One of the major problems facing U.S. SC efforts is the lack of a department or organizational construct at the National/Strategic level designed to represent and/or coordinate the informational component of the DIME.⁶ Though DoD and the DoS represent the military and diplomatic components, respectively, there is no organization with the

⁵ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (Washington, DC: CJCS, 1 February 2006), 30.

⁶ DIME is the acronym commonly used to refer to the diplomatic, informational, military and economic instruments of U.S. national power.

mission or the authority to ensure synchronization of these efforts to create a coordinated and fully vetted message. This shortcoming was addressed in late 2004 in the *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*: “United States strategic communication lacks sustained Presidential direction, effective interagency coordination, optimal private sector partnerships, and adequate resources. Tactical message coordination does not equate with strategic planning and evaluation. Personal commitment by top leaders has not been matched by needed changes in the organizations they lead or in a dysfunctional interagency process.”⁷ This perspective was echoed by Mr. Jeffrey B. Jones, former Director for Strategic Communication and Information on the National Security Council, in a 2005 article in the *Joint Force Quarterly*. In it, he states, “There is little evidence of cooperation, coordination, or even appreciation for the impact of strategic communication.”⁸

As a result of these recognized deficiencies, and following many of the recommendations of the Defense Science Board (DSB), a number of initiatives have recently been undertaken to improve the supporting organizational architecture for SC. In 2006, President Bush directed the establishment of a new Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication led by Ms. Karen Hughes, Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The role of the PCC is to coordinate interagency activities to ensure public diplomacy and SC efforts effectively disseminate the President’s themes and messages. Additionally, it is intended to ensure all agencies and departments assign the same level of priority to SC as does the President. Though the DoS is

⁷ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 2004), 23.

⁸ Jeffrey B. Jones, “Strategic Communication: A Mandate for the United States,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 39, (4th Quarter 2005): 110.

assigned the lead for SC, all agencies and departments were directed to designate an Under Secretary level representative to serve on the PCC.⁹

Efforts have also been taken within DoD to improve support to SC. Responding to the *2006 QDR SC Execution Roadmap*, the department endeavored to create an administrative architecture to support SC. In spring 2006, it created the DoD Strategic Communication Integration Group (SCIG) which is designed to provide guidance and coordinate issues across DoD as well as to serve as a conduit of information and deconfliction with other National level agencies.¹⁰

Though these initiatives are just a couple examples of efforts underway to improve SC, they demonstrate an increased awareness and urgency within the interagency and DoD to create an organizational framework that supports National/Strategic SC efforts. Though much still needs to be done, the need for improvements has been identified and efforts have been initiated.

WHY THE GCCs?

Even if all the initiatives currently underway created a fully functional process at the National/Strategic level, it would not diminish the important role GCCs play in implementing SC efforts within their areas of responsibility (AORs). One question that does arise, however, is whether such diplomatic and informational efforts are or should be a fundamental part of the GCC mission. The argument against such a large role by the GCCs

⁹ Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Homeland Security, Chief of Staff to the President, Director, Office of Management and Budget, United States Trade Representative, Director of National Intelligence, Administrator, Agency for International Development, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman, Broadcasting Board of Governors, memorandum, 8 April 2006.

¹⁰ Traci Swanson Becker, "Tier 0/Tier 1 Strategic Communication Integration," (information paper, USPACOM, 26 April 2006), <http://www2.hq.pacom.smil.mil/common/stratcoms/default.asp?tab=4> (accessed 19 March 2007).

is that the DoS is the lead agency for both diplomacy and SC. As a part of DoD, the GCCs should focus on fighting and winning wars while leaving diplomacy and SC to the DoS. Though there is some validity to this argument, it also has obvious flaws when viewed from the perspective of the larger national interest.

First, as the GWOT has demonstrated, the line between diplomatic and military efforts is frequently blurred, particularly when it comes to the use of information. As noted by Jeffery B. Jones, “Traditional dividing lines between public affairs, public diplomacy and military information operations are blurred because of immediate access to information.”¹¹ Indeed, diplomacy and the military can no longer be seen or function as completely separate entities—a reality further reinforced by the fact the three primary military components identified as promoting SC are information operations (IO), public affairs (PA), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD).¹² When viewed in this light, it is clear diplomatic and informational efforts are not the sole purview of the DoS.

Additionally, though the DoS has the lead in SC, it lacks the opportunities and the funding to compete with DoD engagement capabilities. In U.S Pacific Command (PACOM), for example, recent military operations in Indonesia and the Philippines, ranging from humanitarian relief to counter terrorism efforts, demonstrate the reality that far more citizens of these foreign countries are likely to have contact with American service members than representatives from the DoS. Furthermore, one only needs to look at the *Budget of the United States Government* to understand the disparity in resources between the two departments. In the proposed budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, the baseline discretionary

¹¹ Jones, “Strategic Communication,” 109.

¹² Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 26 December 2006), 2:2.

budget authority for the DoS is merely 7.2% of that of DoD, \$34.9 billion compared to \$481.4 billion, respectively.¹³

In light of these realities, GCCs have to play a large role in SC, simply as a matter of capability. They are, arguably, the only organizations with the resources, manpower and opportunity to engage in the large scale manner required for effective SC. To realize their full potential, however, the GCCs will need to overcome shortfalls at the National/Strategic level by synchronizing the efforts within their own commands as well as those of the interagency components in their AORs. As a helpful guide to overcome these challenges, GCCs can use selected principles of war in executing the SC mission.

OBJECTIVE

“The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal.”¹⁴

-- CJCS Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations

All operations, military or otherwise, should start with clear objectives and guidance.

This step is particularly critical with SC as highlighted in the DSB report:

One reason the U.S. has had difficulty managing the post-war occupation of Iraq is a near total confusion over objectives and strategies. The definition of post-war success has never been enunciated clearly. Similarly, in terms of U.S. strategic communication, a critical step in planning will be to detail exactly the destination toward which we must head. Put simply, the new strategic communication planning function must define what success looks like. And it must formulate a comprehensive strategic framework to achieve it.¹⁵

As with other military operations, GCCs need to provide overarching objectives and desired end states for SC. Providing this critical guidance is the most effective way for GCCs to

¹³ Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year 2008* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy08/index.html> (accessed 23 March 2007).

¹⁴ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 17 September 2006), A:1.

¹⁵ *Report of the Defense Science Board*, 53.

ensure synchronization of the GCC staff and subordinate commands and is a clear way to ensure everyone understands the importance and priority of SC. A good example of providing this critical direction is the *USPACOM Strategic Communication Priority List*. This document gives the planning staffs a list and description of the PACOM Commander's top five priority SC issues.¹⁶ As a result, the planning staffs have clear guidance and a baseline from which they can synchronize activities at all levels and across multiple lines of operation. By providing this guidance, the PACOM Commander enhances the ability of all PACOM components to plan and integrate actions with priority messages.

Another good example of providing clear SC direction is seen at the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). As part of the SC framework within SOUTHCOM, a single source document for all SC guidance was created for "all Southern Command staff, including but not limited to headquarters staff, component and joint task force staff, and security cooperation officers throughout the SOUTHCOM Theater."¹⁷

Through similar efforts, all GCCs can better enable the synchronization of the full range of military operations conducted in their AORs with National/Strategic SC objectives, priority themes and messages. These efforts will also help maintain message discipline at the lower echelons by providing the centralized direction required for decentralized execution. By providing clear objectives the GCCs lay the groundwork for a unity of effort that will allow the massing of capabilities necessary for taking the offensive in the battle of ideas.

UNITY OF COMMAND/EFFORT

"Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of

¹⁶ U.S. Pacific Command, *USPACOM Strategic Communication Priority List*, 7 November 2006, <http://www2.hq.pacom.smil.mil/common/stratcoms/> (accessed 19 March 2007).

¹⁷ U.S. Southern Command, "Creating a Strategic Communication Capability," Powerpoint, 04 December 2006.

effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure.”¹⁸

-- CJCS Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations

Though a true unity of command is currently difficult to achieve with SC activities, a unity of effort can be achieved at the GCC level by not only providing clear objectives but also deliberately creating an organizational framework that enables and forces coordination and synchronization. One of the problems identified with the SC architecture at the National/Strategic level is the lack of a supporting organizational framework. This deficiency is also a problem at the GCC level. As noted earlier, the primary military components of SC are IO, PA and DSPD. Unfortunately, all these disciplines have different missions and fall under different J-codes on the GCC staff. Though “self synchronization” is a common buzzword used to wish this problem away, it is a poor substitute for a formal process. Instead of relying on “self synchronization,” GCCs can be more effective by creating a formal organizational construct.

PACOM has addressed the issue by creating a SC organization and standard operating procedures to support it. PACOM has assigned one agency as lead for SC (J01PA—Public Affairs) while identifying four other primary capability providers and stakeholders, including J39 (Information Operations), J5 (POL-MIL), J2 (Intelligence) and J007 (Public Diplomacy Advisor). To lead planning and guidance as well as to “coordinate staff and interagency functions at echelons above and below,” PACOM has created the Strategic Communication Steering Group (SCSG) which reports to the Deputy Commander (J01) of PACOM. To implement SCSG guidance and tasks, PACOM has an action officer

¹⁸ CJCS, Joint Publication 3-0, A:2.

(AO) level body called the PACOM Influence Working Group (PIWG).¹⁹ By clearly identifying a lead agency as well as creating working groups representing the full spectrum of military operations, PACOM has been able to achieve a degree of unity of effort.

U.S. European Command (EUCOM) has also taken a lead in creating a Theater-wide unity of effort through the establishment of the Strategic Effectiveness and Communication Council (SECC), a bimonthly forum of senior EUCOM and component staff members tasked with synchronizing theater information and influence activities. A major role of the forum is to ensure the command's messages and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) actions match. Additionally, the SECC provides a tasking order with guidance and priorities to the command and components on all information activities.²⁰ The intent, similar to the PACOM process, is to pull together the various elements that impact SC to ensure a unity of effort by coordinating information and actions to create a message that supports the commander's objectives.

OFFENSIVE

“Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to achieve a clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results.”²¹

-- CJCS Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations

After establishing clear objectives and a framework for achieving unity of effort for the various elements of SC, the GCCs can begin to seize the initiative in the battle of ideas.

Being able to take the offensive with SC is particularly important in the GWOT as it enables

¹⁹ U.S. Pacific Command, *Draft USPACOM Strategic Communication Standard Operating Procedures v2.1 (U)*, 8 June 2006. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, <http://www2.hq.pacom.smil.mil/common/stratcoms/default.asp?tab=4> (accessed 19 March 2007).

²⁰ Charles F. Wald, “New Thinking at USEUCOM: The Phase Zero Campaign,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 43, (4th Quarter 2006): 75.

²¹ CJCS, Joint Publication 3-0, A:1.

the U.S. to save lives. General Charles F. Wald, former Deputy Commander of EUCOM, addressed this issue in a 2006 article in *Joint Force Quarterly*: “the preventative focus of Phase Zero is less costly (in both blood and treasure) than a reactive approach to crisis.”²² To be certain, a battle of attrition alone against extremist ideology seems an overly costly approach. As an alternative, soft power, through the combined use of words and actions, should be used to prevent the creation of enemies before they have the chance to make it to the battlefield. One of the ways to achieve this goal is through the deliberate creation of SC plans by the GCCs. A key component of these plans is civil military operations (CMO) conducted as part of Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCPs).

One area where PACOM, working with U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), has seized the initiative utilizing CMO as one line of operation in a larger SC effort is the Philippines. Employing CMO, conducted by Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) in conjunction with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and local authorities on the island of Basilan, the U.S. went on the offensive against the terrorist groups Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) not with bombs and bullets but by building schools and hospitals. As a result, they addressed some of the root causes that helped sustain terrorist recruitment efforts and, in doing so, changed the attitudes of the civilian population. As noted by JSOTF-P Command Sergeant Major William Eckert, “the civilian population is responding positively to the presence of the AFP – no longer a bully but rather a ‘big brother.’ As a result, the people are refusing to harbor the terrorists and are instead turning to the AFP for protection from those ‘lawless’ elements.”²³ A major benefit of identifying and incorporating these operations as part of the larger SC plan is that it

²² Wald, “New Thinking at USEUCOM,” 73.

²³ William Eckert, “Defeating the Idea: Unconventional Warfare in the Southern Philippines,” *Special Warfare* 19, no. 6 (November-December 2006): 20.

gives PA something to talk about: words supporting actions. Additionally, by improving the relationship between the host nation's citizens and its military, the U.S. enables these governments to more effectively address terrorism within their own borders – another strategic objective of the U.S.

EUCOM is also utilizing the elements of soft power to take the fight to the enemy. Through Operation ASSURED VOICE, EUCOM targeted extremist ideology by synchronizing numerous information, influence and security lines of operation. Recognizing “local populations of our new partner nations must see concrete benefits from their cooperation with the United States or they will be vulnerable to extremist influences,”²⁴ EUCOM combined the efforts of military information support teams setting up community outreach programs, youth sports leagues and IO training for host nation militaries with Web site initiatives designed to provide positive themes on topics ranging from the rule of law to open and unbiased media as well as regional news and analysis in multiple languages.²⁵ Through this synchronization of multiple lines of operation, EUCOM is offensively countering terrorist ideology at the grass roots level.

As these examples indicate, utilizing the principle of offensive applies just as much to SC as it does to kinetic operations. The advantage, however, is that offensively employing non-kinetic options such as CMO, diplomacy and information operations can lead to longer lasting gains, particularly when the objective is defeating an idea. It is, in fact, the massing of all these capabilities that provides the GCC the greatest possibility of success with the least long term cost in blood and treasure.

²⁴ Wald, “New Thinking at USEUCOM,” 74.

²⁵ Ibid.

MASS

“To achieve mass is to synchronize and/or integrate appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have a decisive effect in a short period of time.”²⁶

-- CJCS Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations

Massing capabilities by synchronizing multiple lines of operation and combining words and actions into an effective message should be the goal of SC. As noted by Dr. Bradford A. Lee, Professor of Strategy and Policy at the Naval War College, “The key is to align words and pictures with deeds as tightly as possible. The deeds come first. Words and pictures follow.”²⁷ This concept is demonstrated clearly in the Tsunami relief effort, Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE. In this example, PACOM reacted quickly to provide humanitarian aid assistance, synchronizing military intelligence and operations efforts with assistance from relief organizations, the interagency and coalition partners. By combining these efforts to provide aid in such a recognizable and coordinated effort, PACOM was able to mass capabilities into effective SC, particularly in countries with large Muslim populations. To highlight the importance of this effort, international political analyst John W. Rendon noted “The US military operation for Tsunami relief is the only strategic victory in the GWOT in four years.”²⁸

The importance of massing capabilities is further highlighted by the efforts of JSOTF-P and the AFP on Jolo Island. In 2006, having built schools and water distribution centers as well as providing medical, dental and veterinarian assistance to over 13,000 people, Command Sergeant Major Eckert still recognized “Everything that we do in the security,

²⁶ CJCS, Joint Publication 3-0, A:1

²⁷ Bradford A. Lee, “Strategic Communication and the Long War” (presentation, Naval War College, Newport, RI, March 2006).

²⁸ John Rendon of the Rendon Group, keynote speaker for the Conference on Culture and Adversary Modeling (30 November 2005), quoted in Richard J. Josten, “Strategic Communication: Key Enabler for Elements of National Power,” *IO Sphere*, Summer 2006, 19.

capacity-building and CMO arenas can go awry if we fail to communicate our plans and objectives to the local populace.”²⁹ To ensure this communication piece was not overlooked, they engaged in a thorough IO campaign to ensure the populace was informed. Further, they used PSYOP teams to “conduct assessments at each location and propose projects for each location by analyzing the various cultures and subcultures.”³⁰ As a result, they were able to tailor messages and media to the intended audiences, all in an increasingly successful effort to change the attitudes of the local populace towards terrorists.

Though these are just a couple examples of how capabilities can be massed as part of a SC strategy to combat terrorism, they do demonstrate that by massing capabilities along multiple lines of operation, SC can be a very effective tool in the GWOT.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As this paper has demonstrated, there are many examples of GCCs effectively using SC to combat terrorism; however, much still needs to be done for the U.S. to ultimately succeed in the battle of ideas. From a DoD perspective, the initiatives already started should continue and the organizational framework fully developed. Only a top down effort resulting in a streamlined organizational construct can provide a framework that will prevent reliance on “self-synchronization.” If SC is, in fact, going to be a priority effort, GCCs absolutely require an organizational construct above, below and within that supports unity of effort.

In conjunction with the development of an organizational construct, new doctrine also needs to be written to formalize new processes. As a way to eliminate seams within and between GCCs, doctrine will provide the basis for standardizing the way DoD and the GCCs

²⁹ Eckert, “Defeating the Idea,” 21.

³⁰ Ibid., 22.

organize and conduct SC. This standardization is particularly important because the GWOT is, in fact, global. As such, members of the joint force need to be able to coordinate between GCCs, knowing who to contact and being able to speak the same SC language.

To support these efforts, new training standards need to be implemented at the joint and service levels. A cadre of SC experts who are trained in and understand the various SC components needs to be grown within DoD. Beyond doctrine, this training should also cultivate area expertise. The ability to effectively engage and influence is largely dependent on an understanding of the target audience. To understand the various and disparate audiences, SC professionals will need the requisite cultural and language skills. In essence, the effective SC professional will be part public affairs officer, part intelligence officer, part diplomat, part planner and part foreign area officer.³¹

Beyond the mechanics of developing a supporting SC architecture through doctrine and training, GCCs need to reinforce the priority of SC with their staffs and subordinate commands by providing clear objectives and requiring the creation of fully developed SC plans as a priority effort. All words and actions being undertaken within a GCC's AOR should be vetted in accordance with SC objectives and plans. In particular, GCCs should require all CONPLAN, OPLAN and TSCP efforts to be clearly nested into these larger SC plans. Bottom line, SC will be most effective if it is a primary consideration and driving force vice an afterthought.

A final recommendation goes beyond DoD but has ramifications for the GCCs. To achieve unity of effort in SC, utilizing multiple lines of operation, a Goldwater-Nichols type

³¹Carnes Lord makes similar points in his book *Losing Hearts and Minds?*, going so far as to recommend the creation of a separate SC military specialty and career track.

Carnes Lord, *Losing Hearts and Minds? Public Diplomacy and Strategic Influence in the Age of Terror* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 99.

initiative for the interagency needs to be undertaken to ensure all instruments of national power are being optimized. As advanced communication capabilities and the GWOT continue to blend the elements of the DIME, so too must the agencies tasked with these missions blend.

One way to truly mass capabilities is to create geographic commands that incorporate both the current military framework of the GCCs and the geographic bureau framework of the DoS. This proposal is intended to go beyond the current joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) in both the scope of participation and command and control. In particular, it is recommended as a way to move beyond unity of effort and synchronization to unity of command and integration. Only by creating the organizational construct that enables and forces interagency integration will the U.S. be able to truly mass capabilities across the DIME in the devastatingly effective manner demonstrated by the joint military force at the outset of OIF known as “shock and awe.”

CONCLUSION

“You must know something about strategy and tactics and logistics, but also economics and politics and diplomacy and history. You must know everything you can know about military power, and you must also understand the limits of military power. You must understand that few of the important problems of our time have, in the final analysis, been finally solved by military power alone.”³²

*--President John F. Kennedy
(Address to the graduating class of the U.S. Naval Academy, 7 June 1961)*

The United States is engaged in a war of ideas. The ability to win this war of ideas will depend, in no small part, on the ability of the U.S. to conduct successful SC. Occupying the front lines in the GWOT and bearing a great deal of responsibility for this battle of ideas

³² President John F. Kennedy, (address, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, 7 June 1961). http://www.jfklink.com/speeches/jfk/publicpapers/1961/jfk232_61.html (accessed 24 March 2007).

are the GCCs. Success or failure will rely heavily on the ability of GCCs to effectively plan and employ multiple lines of operation, including information operations, diplomacy and civil military operations synchronized as part of a SC plan that effectively combines words and actions into one consistent message.

The GCCs that will find the most success are those that treat SC as a primary mission area and conduct it according to the principles of war. By providing clear objectives and creating an organizational construct that fosters unity of effort, they will enable the massing of capabilities in a synchronized manner that steals the initiative from the enemy. In doing so, the GCCs will be able to deter the creation of a new generation of adversaries and achieve the greatest success of war, winning without having to fight.

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